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Abstract 
Strict deportation policies have emerged as an increasingly popular way for more 
developed countries to tackle the issue of irregular migration. Estimations tell us 
that more that 3 million Afghan refugees will be deported in 2017 and it is argued 
that such massive returns to Afghanistan, despite the ongoing and escalated conflict, 
will risk contributing to severe human right violations as well as risk worsening the 
economic, social and political instability that the country is struggling with.  
In this study, I explore what normative obligations developed states should have 
towards developing countries in terms of the consequences of their deportation 
polices. Using methods of a normative policy analysis, the analysis specifically 
examines whether a declaration between the European Union and the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan that focuses on strengthening deportation efforts, lives up 
to those obligations. The findings include that the deportation policies enforced by 
this declaration do not meet the normative obligations of developed states and this 
thesis argues that greater attention on how the political response in receiving 
countries affects the development prospects in refugee generating countries needs 
to be incorporated into deportation policies to a greater extent. 
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1 Introduction 
Afghan nationals are the second largest group of refugees across the world 
(Duenwald and Talishli, 2017). After almost four decades of conflict, Afghanistan 
still struggles with stabilizing and rebuilding the country. Yet, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) state that 700 000 migrants were returned to Afghanistan in 2016 
and they estimate that over 3 million migrants will be returned in 2017. Such 
numerous returns will have serious implications on the future stability in 
Afghanistan, as it is argued that returns of such rate and volume seriously aggravate 
the government's capacity to absorb refugees in an environment of economic, social 
and political instability (ibid).  
In 2016, the European Union (EU) and Afghanistan agreed on a declaration, 
which explicitly concentrates on strengthening deportation efforts. This declaration 
specifically caught my attention and will be the focus of my thesis.  
1.1  Background and Significance  
In light of the refugee crisis, there is arguably two crisis occurring. The crisis of 
production of refuge flows, and the crises of response (Owen, 2016). The current 
number of displaced people globally is the highest since the aftermath of World 
War II (UNHCR, 2016:5). This should be the time to help those suffering across 
the world and give them shelter, hope and better opportunities to a life without 
violence and persecution, but this normative idea does not truly reflect how the 
world has been responding. Instead, there has been a trend of more restrictive 
immigration policies all around the world. Recent policy trends in Europe for 
example, have focused on strengthening the EU borders and deporting migrants. 
Such policies have been criticized to simply target the problem in the EU and do 
not necessarily aid the crisis of production in the refugee generating countries 
(Gammeltoft-Hansen and Tan, 2017; Owen, 2016, Crisp and Long, 2016).  
The declaration between The EU and the government of Afghanistan, called 
‘The Joint Way Forward’ (JWF), is an example of such policies. The core meaning 
of the declaration is to establish a partnership to facilitate voluntary and forced 
deportations of Afghan nationals who, by various reasons, are not permitted to stay 
in the EU. The agreement states that EU will give increased financial support to 
Afghanistan, and in exchange, Afghanistan promises to accept deported Afghans 
and help them reintegrate (The EU and Afghanistan, 2016). In a joint press release 
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they stated that the declaration “is a triple-win solution for Afghanistan, the 
European Union and its Member States, addressing an issue of major concern to 
our citizens” (EEAS, 2016).  
This thesis strongly questions whether this declaration will benefit Afghanistan, 
or essentially the Afghan nationals - both the ones who are being returned and those 
who never left, since sending back large numbers of vulnerable Afghan nationals 
despite the ongoing and escalated conflict will risk contributing to severe human 
right violations as well as risk worsening the economic, social and political 
instability that the country is struggling with (Duenwald and Talishli, 2017).  
1.2 Specific Aims and Research Questions 
The purpose of this research is to examine if the deportation policies endorsed by 
the JWF declaration can be considered morally acceptable in relation to a specific 
normative standard. There are two research questions that will guide this study:  
 
What moral responsibilities should developed states have towards developing 
states in adopting deportation policies?   
 
Does the Joint Way Forward declaration and the deportation policies it entails, live 
up to these moral responsibilities? 
 
The first research question is referring to deportation policies in general and will 
drive this thesis into formulating a normative argument of what moral obligations 
developed states have towards developing countries in regard to the consequences 
of their deportation polices. The answer to the first question will provide this thesis 
with a normative standard of deportation policies, which will be used to answer my 
second question.  
Previous research has dealt with similar questions about international moral 
responsibilities of liberal states, but in the context of immigration policies in 
general. My study will contribute to those studies by focusing on deportation 
policies and specifically the JWF declaration. 
1.3 Disposition of Thesis 
The following chapter will discuss the methodology used in this study. In chapter 
three, I review the existing literature on immigration justice and develop the 
normative framework that will be used to evaluate the Joint Way Forward 
declaration. Chapter four offers a brief contextual background to migration issues 
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in Afghanistan and an outline of the core elements of the Joint Way Forward 
declaration. The next chapter will encompass my normative-empirical analysis. 
Drawing from empirical evidence presented in previous studies and reports, I 
analyze whether the motivations and consequences of the declaration live up the 
moral commitment of developed states as outlined in chapter 3. The final chapter 
will summarize the findings and provide a conclusion of the study. 
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2 Method 
This thesis uses the methodology of a normative policy analysis under which the 
deportation policies enforced by the JWF will be the case of analysis. A normative 
policy analysis gives particular attentions to the moral value of various outcomes 
from a policy and the moral interpretation is generally guided by asking questions 
such as who counts and to what degree, what are the criteria of moral obligations 
and who are the agents charged with meeting these obligations (Robert and 
Zeckhauser, 2011:618; Dunne et al., 2013:37).  
I follow three steps that Tremblay and Abi-Zeid (2015:236) use in their value-
based policy analysis; (1) construct normative arguments based on relevant 
literature, (2) abstracting those arguments for the application of a normative 
argumentative model, (3) applying this model to a policy in order to evaluate it. By 
employing this methodology, this research develops a normative framework 
through which the deportation policies enforced by the JWF will be analyzed.  
2.1 Data Collection and Analysis 
This study has taken the form of a pure desk study and the empirical material that 
is used and analyzed in this study mainly comprises of documents that take a variety 
of forms. As Bryman highlights, it is important to be aware of that all documents 
are influenced by its authors and data can be framed in different ways depending 
on the purpose of the documents (Bryman, 2012:555). This research takes careful 
precaution by applying source criticism whenever relevant and the information will 
be evaluated in relation to where the documents originate.  
The primary sources which have been considered for this research includes 
documents deriving from the EU, namely the JWF declaration and a document 
which maps out the main arguments to why the JWF declaration was needed, as 
well as NGO reports and previous academic research on deportation and 
repatriation efforts in Afghanistan. 
The secondary sources used to analyze these primary documents, includes 
academic literature within moral philosophy, global justice and ethics in migration. 
These sources serve as the backbone to the development of my normative 
framework, identifying what moral obligations developed countries should have 
towards developing countries in adopting deportation policies. This normative 
standard of deportation policies is used to examine whether the motivations and 
consequences of the JWF can be considered morally just. 
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To clarify, the framework is not reflecting upon what legal moral duties the EU 
are assigned. Rather the framework offers a normative standard that is consistent 
with larger moral values of global justice and defines obligations that developed 
states should in principle embrace. Furthermore, by challenging existing legal 
obligations by which the EU justifies the JWF, my normative framework highlights 
ways in which the JWF contradicts commitment that should be central to developed 
states. 
2.2 Delimitations  
The normative standard that I present reflects upon the obligations liberal developed 
states should have towards developing countries, emphasizing the power dynamics 
between the two. I use definitions such as developed states, liberal states and states 
in the global north as synonyms throughout this paper, referring to the upper hand 
such states have in relation to poor, developing states in the international arena 
(Thomas and Allen, 2000:358; Potter et.al 2008:179; Pogge, 2002:20). The 
framework I present in this paper, should therefore be limited to evaluate 
deportation policies where this power dynamic between developing and developed 
states is present. 
Moreover, the framework is designed to analyze the moral value of various 
outcomes of a particular deportation policy, which gives this framework a 
consequentialist approach. A policy that has been put in place for a longer time will 
be easier to evaluate, whereas analyzing a recently adopted policy as in the case of 
this thesis, it requires calculating potential consequences (Dunne et al. 20013). 
Evaluating the JWF, therefore requires this author to rely on empirical evidence 
from previous deportation efforts and assume that similar outcomes can be expected 
if the context does not change significantly. In that way, this thesis is limited by its 
own assumption to the degree that predicting the future never can be 100% reliable.  
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3 Development of the Normative 
Framework  
The central goal of this chapter is to answer my general research question, to 
formulate a normative framework about what obligations developed liberal states 
should have towards developing countries in the scope of deportation policies.  
In 3.1, I discuss the literature on normative obligations of developed states and 
distinguish between nationalist and cosmopolitan approaches. In 3.2 I argue that if 
developed states are at least partially responsible for the reasons why refugees flee, 
then developed states must take into account the interests of foreigners at least under 
certain conditions. In 3.3, I argue that liberal states have the moral obligation to 
refrain from harming and compensate those who already been harmed, with 
particular attention to the least advantaged. In 3.4, I develop a normative framework 
that defines under which conditions strict deportation policies will be considered 
unjust.    
3.1 Immigration Justice and International Obligations  
Cosmopolitanism and nationalism offer different understandings of what normative 
obligations liberal states ought to have towards foreigners. This section discusses 
the conflict between the obligation to treat and respect all human beings equally 
and the legitimacy of state borders. 
Nationalist principles suggest that states should choose immigration policies 
that reflect the national interest, this means that states are free to choose policies 
that prioritize the interests of citizens over foreign actors (Higgins, 2013:22). 
Several nationalist scholars perceive states’ obligations to foreigners are a matter 
of humanitarianism, essentially that basic conditions for living a decent life and 
human rights should be met (Miller 1995:74; Rawls, 1993). Walzer uses analogies 
such as meeting a stranger in the desert or finding an injured stranger at your 
doorstep, to demonstrate the logic of states having a moral responsibility to basic 
assistance (Walzer 1983:33). But central to the nationalist view is that all moral 
questions about the duties of states, can only be answered with careful 
considerations of the state’s economic and institutional capability of allowing those 
duties to be carried out (Ratner, 2013:15).  
Drawing from these arguments, one can conclude that nationalist approaches do 
not set much limitations to immigration policies. They do not reject the principle of 
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offering assistance to aid migrants fleeing from horrible living situations, but then 
again they note that such duties should not be at the expense of their own citizens. 
In that sense, a state can justify adopt almost any immigration policy, arguing that 
they respond to the best interest of their citizens, whether it is restrictive policies (if 
they believe immigration will harm the interest of their own citizens) or permissive 
policies (if they believe immigration is in the best interest of their citizens).  
In opposition to nationalist approaches, cosmopolitan principles claim that 
liberal states may not favor the interest of their citizens over foreigners in their 
policy-making (Higgins, 2013:59). Core principles of cosmopolitanism are 
individualism and universal equality, and cosmopolitan arguments are based on the 
idea that all human beings belong to the same collectivity and should be treated as 
equals independently of their nationality, language or religion (López, 2010:663). 
These moral values set limitations to what policies states can justly adopt and 
moreover require greater international responsibilities. International human rights 
law is an example of when the international obligations promoted in the 
cosmopolitan view have been recognized and adopted into international law. 
International human rights laws include a number of rights that all people in the 
world is entitled to, which gives individuals and states the responsibility to adopt 
policies that further this goal (Ratner, 2013:5). While cosmopolitans would argue 
that turning those rights into obligations is a good thing, and claim that obligations 
should go further than just basic human rights, advocates of the nationalist 
perspective argue that such obligations are problematic since they limit a state’s 
freedom to govern itself however it chooses (Ibid:17). Similar arguments can be 
made in the debate over immigration policies. Cosmopolitan principles require just 
immigration policies to undertake careful considerations of how the policies affect 
all human beings involved: the citizens of the host country and asylum seekers, as 
well as the non-migrating residents of sending countries (Higgins, 2013:59). 
Whereas nationalists argue that such commitment would hinder states from 
preforming its main duties, which is to respond to best interest of the nation state 
(ibid:22).  
This discussion on international obligations highlights two different 
philosophical stands on what moral responsibility developed states ought to have 
when formulating immigration policies. These conflicting views on immigration 
justice are further elaborated on in the next section by contextualizing these 
arguments in relation to globalization and the international order.  
3.2 Refugee Migration and the Global Order  
In this section, I show that because of the power dynamic between developed and 
developing countries embedded in global institutions, liberal states are at least 
partially blameworthy for the reasons that make people leave their countries.  
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Without going into what is legally considered a legitimate reason to seek refuge, 
studies on refugee migration show that refugees generally come from conflict-
ridden, poor countries, where political instability, conflict, human rights abuses, 
lack of development and economic opportunities could be considered the 
immediate causes of seeking refuge in another country (Nyberg-Sorensen et al., 
2002:14,23; Minter, 2011:49; Meyers, 2014:70).  
These immediate causes are recognized by both approaches. Although, 
nationalist scholars generally claim that immediate causes of emigration such as 
poverty and conflict, primarily are the result of internal factors and that it is the 
sovereign state’s responsibility to address those issues. However, the cosmopolitan 
view recognizes the influence of external factors (Higgins, 2013:38). Higgins 
(ibid:180) criticizes the nationalist view by stating that the idea of an international 
order in which states have absolute internal sovereignty is a flawed understanding 
of how the modern world works which has long been outdated, if ever accurate. 
Rather, the last decades of globalization and the establishment of global economic 
and political institutions have made the world more interconnected and nation states 
more interdependent on each other.  
In this global network, it is recognized that states in the global north have much 
greater potential to set global agendas and influence the terms of cooperation which 
makes the work of global institutions skewed towards the development in the North. 
This is usually done with little regard for the systematic harms these institutional 
arrangements impose on already poor countries (Thomas and Allen, 2000:358; 
Potter et.al 2008:179; Pogge, 2002:20). In his book World Poverty and Human 
Rights, Pogge (2002:17) elaborates further on this argument and puts forward 
several ways that wealthy states of the global north, through their control of global 
institutions, actively harm the poor countries in the global south. One way is 
through the superior bargaining power and expertise of wealthier countries that was 
previously mentioned (ibid:20). Another way is through their control over global 
economic institutions, for example by maintaining high trade tariffs on imports, 
especially those they consider “unfairly cheap,” while requiring poorer states to 
significantly reduce theirs (ibid:17). Pogge is also concerned with how wealthy 
states of the global north treat corrupt leaders and elites in poor countries. This is 
problematic both in terms of how global institutions grant rulers of sovereign states 
international borrowing privilege, which indirectly encourages political instability, 
but also that they are considered as a legitimate partner to cooperate with (ibid:40-
41).   
These opposing understandings of the international community and how states 
relate to each other are significant when formulating an argument of international 
obligations. The idea of how all sovereign states are in control of their own 
development is compelling but not entirely true (Lopez, 2012; Higgins, 2013:180). 
To reflect the reality one needs to recognize the arguments that Pogge highlights of 
how the global order is structured and how developed countries are partially 
involved in nursing the underdevelopment of developing countries. One can 
therefore argue that the nationalist approach falls short in the debate of immigration 
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justice because they neglect the impact that global structures and forces of 
inequality have in causing migration.  
Instead, I argue that since liberal states to some extent influence the 
development of developing states, liberal states are at least partially blameworthy 
for the reasons that force people to migrate from their countries. Hence, this thesis 
argues that developed countries should be responsible in aiding to solve problems 
that they have been involved with creating. This denotes that liberal states should 
be obligated to consider the consequences of their immigration policies beyond 
state borders. Essentially, based on the discussion of this section, immigration 
policies should be required to respond to the crisis of production in refugee 
generating countries as well as to the crisis in host countries. 
3.3 The Refrain from Harm Principle   
So far, this chapter has established that developed states should have the moral 
responsibility to consider to the interest of developing countries as well as their 
own, when adopting immigration policies. This section continues on that argument 
and identifies under what conditions an immigration policy can be considered 
morally just.  
In her article, Shelley Wilcox, develops a specific moral principle of 
international obligations that reflects the discussions provided by this chapter so 
far. Her principle, The Global Harm Principle, suggests that “[S]ocieties should not 
harm foreigners; and societies that violate this duty must: (1) stop harming these 
foreigners immediately; and (2) compensate their victims for the harm they have 
already caused them” (Wilcox, 2007:277). She justifies the category of individuals 
whom agents should not harm on cosmopolitan grounds; since all human beings 
deserve equal moral respect, there are no legitimate reason for claiming that harm 
to noncitizens is any less morally problematic than harm to citizens (ibid:278). 
To make sense of this principle, it is crucial to define the concept of harm. There 
are two questions that need to be answered; first, in what terms does the policy harm 
a social group? Second, relative to what standard does the policy harm a social 
group. Higgins (2013:137), who elaborated on Wilcox principle in his book, is 
rather general in terms of the first question and argues that a policy harms if it 
diminishes the capabilities or opportunities of its members. Wilcox is more precise 
and argues that a policy will be considered to harm others when an agent’s welfare 
interests are being impeded by a policy. With the notion ‘welfare interests’, she 
refers to basic conditions that are required to live a decent life. Welfare interest by 
her notion includes; access to food, drinks, clothing, shelter, health care and 
education, as well as physical integrity and a safe economic and political 
environment. Furthermore, she argues that these duties that this principle assigns 
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must be fulfilled before states may use immigration policies in service of other 
national goals (Wilcox, 2007:274). 
In regard to the second question Higgins elaborates on several different options. 
One suggestion is that an immigration policy harms a social group if it makes that 
group worse off than it was prior to the adoption of that policy, however he argues 
that this minimal standard is too weak since it does not consider to what extent the 
previous policy have caused any harm (Higgins, 2012:138). Another option is that 
an immigration policy harms a social group if it causes that group’s capabilities to 
fall below a specified threshold. The problem with this suggestion is that it requires 
measuring capabilities which makes the implementation of this standard very 
difficult. Instead he advocates that, an immigration policy is unjust if there is 
another immigration policy under which the capabilities of social groups that are 
already unjustly disadvantaged would be better off (ibid:139). Higgins further 
states that “any immigration policy that does not satisfy the standard of harm set 
out here will, as a consequence, serve the interests of privileged social groups at the 
expense of social groups that are already unjustly disadvantaged” (ibid:140).  This 
definition provided by Higgins recognizes the global structures of inequality and 
put emphasis on compensating those who already been unjustly harmed.  
A critique towards this argument might be that all immigration policies 
inevitably benefit some disadvantaged groups while harming others (prospective 
refugees, deported migrants as well as disadvantaged groups in both the sending 
and receiving county), hence it might be impossible to “not harm already 
disadvantaged groups”. One might argue that just immigration policies should 
equally distribute the burdens and benefits across the affected social groups 
(ibid:191). However, this would only be fair if the affected social groups are equally 
advantaged before the policy implementation (ibid:197). Therefore, in the light of 
structural inequality, I argue that distributions of benefits and burdens should favor 
social groups that are most disadvantaged. In other words, the main objective of a 
just immigration policy is still to benefit as many people as possible and not harm 
anyone, but if harming some group is unavoidable, the least advantages should be 
prioritized.  On these grounds, I argue that liberal states should have the moral 
obligation to refrain from harming basic welfare interests and compensate those 
who already been harmed, with particular attention to the least advantaged. I will 
call this principle “Refrain from Harm” from now on in the paper. 
The international obligations and the Refrain from Harm principle that I have 
put forward in this section, represent the core of the normative framework that I 
will use to evaluate the Joint Way Forward declaration. In the last section, I will 
adapt these arguments of immigration justice to the specific context of deportation 
policies.  
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3.4 Moral Responsibilities in Relation to Deportation 
Policies  
In this section I explore how the Refrain from Harm-principle relates to deportation 
policies. The main argument is that if a deportation policy harms an already 
disadvantaged group, the policy would be considered morally unjust. Drawing on 
findings from previous studies on deportation policies, I will present in what ways 
relevant groups of individuals could be harmed by the definition provided by 
Wilcox. I will divide the welfare interests into four categories; physical wellbeing, 
psychological wellbeing, economic opportunities, and safe political environment, 
and differentiate between four types of actors: citizens of host countries, 
prospective refugees, and deported migrants, and citizens of refugee generating 
countries. 
3.4.1 Citizens of Host Countries 
Strict deportation policies are not expected to cause any physical or 
psychological harm to citizens of the host country, nor are strict deportation policies 
expected to cause any significant harm in relation to economic opportunities and 
the political stability. At the most, the host country might lose valuable assets in 
terms of economic, human and social capital the newcomers can bring (Nyberg-
Sorensen et al., 2002:15), but not to the extent that it would be regarded as harming 
by the definition presented above. 
Instead, it is generally argued that fairly loose deportation policies can harm the 
local population in terms of the economic, social and political costs that large 
numbers of refugees could impose. More specifically, large numbers of immigrants 
could potentially overwhelm local welfare systems and lower the capacity of the 
country’s social services, as well as take over jobs that might otherwise have been 
available to low-skilled locals at a higher wage. It is further argued that cultural 
differences between the local population and immigrants might lead to tension at 
best, and violence at worst (Toft, 2007:144).  
3.4.2 Prospective Refugees 
One of the main arguments supporting deportation policies are that it is important 
that refugees who not meet the asylum criteria return, so that host countries can 
afford to protect those who meet the criteria with initiatives on relocation and 
resettlement (DeBono, 2016:104).  Therefore, deportation policies indicate that 
there will be greater possibilities and opportunities for the ones that meet the asylum 
criteria and would ideally not pose any harm in terms of the physical, economic or 
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safety aspects for prospective refugees. However, studies show that the fear of 
being deported cause serious psychological harm and have significant effects on the 
lives and mental wellbeing of prospective refugee waiting for their final decision.  
In contrast, less mental-health problems on prospective migrants are expected when 
fairly loose deportation policies are adopted (DeBono, 2016:108). Although, 
similar to the citizens of the host country, prospective refugees could potentially be 
harmed by the economic, social and political strains that can be imposed if 
deportation policies are absent. 
3.4.3 Deported Migrants 
A common theme across countries that migrants face when returning, is 
discrimination. Deportees generally tend to be treated with suspicion and exclusion, 
and are sometimes even assaulted and arrested, charged for leaving the country 
illegally in the first place. Discrimination and exclusion have proven to make 
entering the labor market and building sustainable livelihoods very difficult 
(Arowolo, 2000:64; Carr, 2014:146,148). However, its noted that if the migrants 
have acquired capital or valuable skills during their time abroad, the possibility of 
successful reintegration increases significantly.  
A stable social, economic and institutional environment that are capable of 
reintegrate returnees, seems critical when it comes to successful and sustainable 
returns (Nyberg-Sorensen et al., 2002:279). Failure to achieve reintegration when 
large number of people returning, may instead lead again to internal conflict, 
political tension and civil war which will have the opposite effect of that is desired 
(Arowolo, 2000:66). Hence, if the country of origin still can not provide a decent 
life upon return, many returnees will be obligated emigrate once again (Crisp and 
Long, 2016:145; Carr, 2014:150). Essentially, if the migrant returns empty-handed 
and if the country of origin lack capabilities to reintegrate returnees, deportations 
have the risk of harming migrants in all categories. The absence of deportation 
policies would mean that this group will be significantly less harmed in all 
categories.  
3.4.4 Citizens of Refugee Generating Countries 
Even though non-migrating citizens of a refugee generating country is often 
neglected in deportation debates, it is quite well known that it is rarely the most 
affected and the poorest who migrate, since it requires a certain capital to migrate 
(Castles and Miller 2009:23; Minter, 2011:44). This implies that the most 
disadvantaged is often left in the refugee generating country, which based on the 
Refrain from Harm principle should be a reason for attention. 
Similar to the discussion on deported migrants, the consequences of strict 
deportation policies in relation to the non-migrating individuals, is very dependent 
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on the economic and political environment of the country. If the country lacks the 
capability to absorb and integrate the returnees, large numbers of people returning 
have the risk of worsening the economic, social and political instability that the 
country is struggling with (Kapur, 2014:492; Özerdem and Sofizada, 2006:82). The 
potential harm deportations could have on the development, would risk 
deteriorating the living standards for those residing in the country and might force 
even more people to flee to another country or continent in order to meet their basic 
needs (Arowolo, 2000). Hence, under such circumstances deportations could 
effectively harm the residents in the country in relation to the all four categories.  
If forced deportations were not carried out, the development prospects of the 
country would not be more damaged and maybe even enhanced, seeing as the ones 
who do choses to return have greater capacity to be agents of change compared to 
deported returnees (van Houte, et al, 2014).  
3.4.5 Trade-offs in Harm 
The tables below summarize the potential harm that strict versus fairly loose 
deportation policies can impose in accordance with the Refrain from Harm 
principle. 
 
  Source: own compilation 
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Source: own compilation  
 
Table. 1 sums up the potential harm of strict deportation policies and presents that 
most of the harm is evidently caused in the refugee generating country and relates 
to how well the country will be able to adapt and reintegrate the returnees. This 
denotes that just deportation policies must take into consideration how strict 
deportation policies will affect the development prospects of sending countries. 
Table. 2 sums up the potential harm of fairy loose deportation policies, highlighting 
the considerable economic, social and political cost that large numbers of refugees 
would impose in the host country. Evidently, deportation policies, strict or loose, 
will necessarily entail harm to some extent on one group or another. This forces 
policy-makers to make a decision on how to distribute these harms in a morally just 
way. In light of the normative framework I have presented, the trade-offs need to 
be based according to considerations of the least advantaged group. That being said, 
a just deportation policy should avoid imposing the harms set out in the tables, 
however, if imposing harm to some group is unavoidable, the most vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups should be prioritized.  
This moral duty sets limits to what deportation policies developed states can 
justly adopt. On the grounds of the Refrain from Harm principle, a deportation 
policy will be considered unjust if deportations are used to enhance the capabilities 
of privileged groups at the expense of harming welfare capabilities of 
disadvantaged groups.  
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4 The Joint Way Forward  
This chapter starts off with a brief background to the migration context in 
Afghanistan. Thereafter I highlight essential elements of the Joint Way Forward. 
4.1 Background    
Ravaged by conﬂict for more than 35 years, Afghanistan has seen the coming and 
going of Kings and presidents, mullahs and militias and the world’s superpowers. 
War, tension, and insurgent violence have left a heavy toll on Afghanistan's 
institutions and its way of life (UNDP, 
2016). The war has destroyed much of 
the industry and economic institutions, in 
combination with political instability and 
high levels of corruption, Afghanistan is 
struggling to rebuild and stabilize despite 
the billions of dollars of aid that have 
been given to the country (Jazayery, 
2002:235). Poverty, high unemployment 
rates, widespread discrimination and 
human rights abuses towards women, 
and inadequate healthcare are some of the challenges the country is struggling with. 
Although, because of the ongoing and escalated conflict, human security remains 
Afghanistan's major challenge (UNDP, 2016). In 2015, Afghanistan reached record 
levels of terrorist attacks and civilian causalities, and in a document on migration, 
the European Commission (EC) estimate that both the security and economic 
situation are likely to worsen (EC and the EEAS, 2016). 
The ongoing conflict has resulted in great numbers of Afghan nationals seeking 
safer and better living standards elsewhere for many decades now. Statistics 
deriving from UNHCR shows that already in the early 1990s, 6 million Afghan 
refugees had fled the country. Between 1992 and 1997, many returned and the 
number of refugees fell. However, as Taliban captured most of the country (1997-
2001), a new wave of Afghan refugees emerged, constituted of both returnees and 
new refugees. Most of the refugees were residing in neighboring countries such as 
Pakistan and Iran at this point (Jazayery, 2002:240). It is not until quite recently 
that significant numbers of refugees with Afghan origin have migrated to Europe. 
However, compared to the numbers of refugees in Iran (2,5 million) and Pakistan 
Source: UNDP, 2016 
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(2,9 million) 1, the 213 000 migrants arriving in Europe during 2015 might not come 
across as significant. The refugee flow to Europe is partly due to the escalated 
conflict in Afghanistan, but also due to restrictions they face on integration to 
society and labor market in Pakistan and Iran (EC and EEAS, 2016). Staying in 
those countries is therefore not a reliable solution in the long-term, hence, many 
feel obligated to flee to Europe. Afghan nationals represent the second largest 
groups of migrants and asylum seekers to the EU and many of them are 
unaccompanied minors (ibid).  
4.2 The Establishment of the Joint Way Forward   
In March 2016, a document proposing possible leverage for a collaboration with 
Afghanistan on migration issues was formed serving as a stepping stone to what 
later became to be known as the JWF declaration. In this document, members of 
the EC and the European External Action Service (EEAS), argue that due to the 
deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, as well as pressure from Pakistan and Iran, 
there is a high risk of further migratory flows to Europe and “[t]his calls for a 
strengthening of interventions to maintain asylum space in the region” (ibid:3). In 
other words, they need to strengthen deportations of asylum-seekers that not meet 
the criteria to stay in the EU, in order to make room for the ones who do meet the 
criteria of protection. However, they note that they are aware of the deteriorating 
security situation in Afghanistan, thus they emphasize the need of a common 
definition of safe areas in Afghanistan in order eliminate the risk of refoulement2. 
The document further recognizes that development aid should be used in favor 
of promoting a safer and ultimately sustainable Afghan state. Approximately 40% 
of the GDP comes from aid, so without continued international aid, the state 
established after 2002 is unlikely to prevail. Development aid is therefore an 
important component in order to generate a favorable environment for deportees 
and will be secured if Afghanistan signs the JWF declaration (ibid).   
These incentives later resulted in the establishment of the declaration called the 
Joint Way Forward on migration issues between Afghanistan and the EU, on the 2d 
October 2016. The main objective of the declaration is articulated as follows: 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 Estimations on the amount of refuges residing in different countries varies a lot across different sources. This 
thesis relies on the numbers published by the European Commission and the European External Action Service.  
2 Refoulement refers to the forcible return of refugees or asylum seekers to a country where they are liable to be 
subjected to persecution. 
  17 
This JWF identifies a series of actions to be taken as a matter 
of urgency by the EU and the Government of Afghanistan with 
the objective to establish a rapid, effective and manageable 
process for a smooth, dignified and orderly return of Afghan 
nationals who do not fulfil the conditions in force for entry to, 
presence in, or residence on the territory of the EU, and to 
facilitate their reintegration in Afghanistan in a spirit of 
cooperation (EU and Afghanistan, 2016:1).  
4.3 Core Elements of the Joint Way Forward  
The declaration entails different aspects of cooperation. The scope of this thesis is 
limited to the parts of this declaration that deal with under what conditions migrants 
will be returned, and how they plan to manage the return and reintegration process. 
By signing this declaration, Afghanistan reaffirms its commitment to readmit 
unlimited numbers of Afghan nationals who no longer are permitted to stay in the 
EU. A maximum of 50 persons per flight is stated, but there are no limitations on 
how many flights that can be organized (EU and Afghanistan, 2016). 
The declaration further declares that deportations of Afghan nationals will be 
carried out under both voluntary and forced circumstances. Voluntary in this sense 
refers to the voluntary compliance with an obligation to return of illegally staying 
migrants (EC, 2015:12). This decision will include all groups of migrants, including 
women and unaccompanied minors. It is stated that if the minor does not have any 
relatives left in the country, “adequate reception and care-taking arrangements” 
have to be put in place in Afghanistan in order to proceed with the deportation (EU 
and Afghanistan, 2016:).  
In order to ensure safe returns and to facilitate reintegration, the EU is funding 
programs providing support for Afghan nationals returning to Afghanistan. The 
JWF acknowledges that it is important that returnees are able to create a safe and 
sustainable livelihood and the programs will focus on skills development, labor 
market access and job-creation. They also state that improving employment 
opportunities is an effective way of preventing future irregular migration. The EU 
declare that they will support the Government of Afghanistan and the IOM 
(International organization for migration) in order to meet these objectives (ibid).  
There are several aspects of this declaration that will significantly change the 
current practices of deportations. I will discuss and analyze these aspects and 
evaluate their normative standing in relation to the Refrain from Harm-principle.  
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5 Normative-Empirical Analysis  
Based on the Refrain from Harm principle, this chapter evaluates whether the 
deportation policies enforced by the JWF can be considered morally acceptable. 
This is done through a thorough investigation of the empirical circumstances in 
which these policies enact.   
Under existing asylum laws, a migrant shall not be returned if they will be a 
target of persecution or human rights violations (Hunt, 2014:500). In order to assess 
what legal status the migrant should have, all asylum seekers are entitled to a 
thorough asylum process where the migrant’s “protection needs and compelling 
humanitarian reasons, if any, have been considered in accordance with the 
applicable legislation” (EU and Afghanistan, 2016:2). If the migrant is given the 
legal status irregular migrant, it is argued that the migrant can return without facing 
persecution or human rights violations. However, this does not necessarily mean 
that they will not be harmed.   
As the normative framework of this thesis has established, developed countries 
should have the moral obligation to refrain from harming basic welfare interest of 
already disadvantaged groups in adopting deportation policies. As table 1 and 2 in 
subsection 3.4.5 shows, most harm that are caused by strict deportation policies is 
the result of an instable political and socioeconomic environment. Physical and 
psychological harm tend to be the effects of conflicts and not being able to earn 
money for survival, healthcare or education. Therefore, the analysis is divided into 
two parts, looking at the political environment and the capability to reintegrate 
deported migrants. The potential physical and psychological harm is discussed in 
relations to the two primary aspects.  
5.1  Safe Political Environment  
In terms of the political environment, table 1 shows that large scale deportations 
have the potential to harm deported Afghans and the citizens of Afghanistan by 
intensifying the conflict. As decades of war in the country have shown us, conflict 
harms its citizens in several ways. Consequences have included difficulties to find 
a job, limited access to health care and education, outbreak of fighting and danger 
of bombing for example (Monsutti, 2008:58). This is already the reality for many 
Afghans living in Afghanistan, therefore, to refrain from harming, deportation 
policies should not be carried out unless they promote stability.  
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Evidence from previous large-scale repatriation efforts suggests that success 
seems to be limited to when returns are driven by evident and fundamental changes 
in countries of origin and where safety and voluntariness of such returns are not in 
question (Crisp and Long, 2016:143). Economic and political development of the 
country should therefore be a key priority in order to enhance the capacity for the 
country to receive and reintegrate returnees successfully. Thus, the development 
efforts articulated as one of the goals of this cooperation is an important initiative 
for a sustainable solution to the refugee crisis. However, because of the 
deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, it is essential that European aid to 
Afghanistan is used to ensure peace and security, and to rebuild the country first 
and foremost (Oxfam et al.,2016). As stated in 4.1, political and economic 
instability have characterized the situation in Afghanistan for decades despite 
billions of dollars of aid (Jazayery, 2002:235). Therefor one cannot assume that the 
development initiatives by this declaration will have immediate effect. Thus, 
deportations at this point should still be treated with caution in regard to the 
hazardous political environment, for the sake of refrain from harming the deported 
Afghan migrants as well as the non-migrating citizens of Afghanistan.  
Despite the awareness that a safe political environment is vital in order for 
deportations to be successful and sustainable, the pressure on refugees to return has 
not disappeared even though conflicts have remained unsolved (Crisp and Long, 
2016). JWF is a textbook example of this. To get around this problem, the EC and 
the EEAS proposes that safe areas within the country should be identified (EC and 
EEAS, 2016). In that way, the policy-makers of the JWF can justify their 
deportations by claiming that deportations are only carried out to areas that are 
considered safe. However, there are three main issues with those ‘safe areas’. First, 
scholars have been critical of such general assessments of safety since it deals with 
unstable states where situations can change rapidly (Hunt, 2014:514-516; 
Engelmann, 2014:282). Second, only three of the EU member states accept their 
citizens to travel to certain areas in Afghanistan, while the majority of all EU 
member states advice their citizens to “avoid all travels completely” or “avoid non-
essential travel” to Afghanistan because of the security situation (EC, 2017). This 
implies that there are different criteria of safety depending on people’s nationality, 
which is indefensible from a cosmopolitan perspective. Third, the discussion on 
safe areas mentioned in the EC and EEAS paper on migration issues, are not 
reflected upon in the actual JWF declaration.  
It has been heavily criticized by several NGO’s, that the JWF suggest that safe 
returns are possible in Afghanistan despite the ongoing conflict (Oxfam et al, 2016). 
Additionally, there seems to be little recognition on how increased returns will 
affect the security situation in Afghanistan. If the estimations that over 3 million 
people will return (from Iran, Pakistan and Europe) in 2017 is correct (Duenwald 
and Talishli, 2017), return at such a rate and volume will pose considerable 
challenges to the absorption capacity and there is a high risk of spurring the ongoing 
conflict. This thesis argues that sending back irregular migrants under these 
conditions is morally irresponsible since there is a great risk of harming the basic 
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welfare interests of deported Afghan migrants, as well as the citizens of Afghanistan 
in all four categories; physically, psychologically, economically and politically, and 
would moreover induce the risk of causing further emigration. 
On the other hand, not deporting irregular migrants would cause some strains 
on the political environment in EU member states, which could harm citizens of 
host countries and prospective migrants as presented in Table 2. However, 
considering the political stability and institutional capacity that EU member states 
have in relation to Afghanistan, the harm irregular migrants would cause in the EU 
would be far less compared to the harm deported migrants would impose in 
Afghanistan. According to the global peace index and the fragile state index, 
Afghanistan is ranked as 160/162 (global peace index) and 171/178 (fragile state 
index), while almost all of the EU member states are ranked as the top 50 in both 
regards (Vision of humanity, 2016; Fund for peace, 2017). Additionally, Afghan 
nationals, regardless of their legal status or where they reside, are arguably the least 
advantaged group in this context since conflict and war have characterized their 
whole lives. Their interests should therefore be prioritized in light of the Refrain 
from Harm principle.   
As long as the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan remains, this thesis 
concludes that it is morally unjust carry out deportations. Liberal states must fulfill 
the duties of not harming basic welfare interests of the less advantaged, before using 
deportations policies in service of other national goals.  
5.2  Capability to Reintegrate  
Additional to political stability, it is important that Afghanistan has the capability 
to reintegrate the deported migrants in order for returns to be sustainable in the long 
term. It is especially vital that the socioeconomic environment allows deported 
migrants to enter the labor market in order to secure a sustainable livelihood. 
Nevertheless, evidence from previous repatriation efforts in Afghanistan, 
demonstrate that returns of great volumes of refugees pose considerable challenges 
to the absorption capacity of the country (Özerdem and Sofizada, 2006:82). 
Discrimination, high unemployment rates and other challenges of building a 
sustainable livelihood in combination with conflict, have forced many Afghan 
returnees to emigrate once again (Özerdem and Sofizada, 2006; Monsutti, 2008; 
van Houte et al., 2014). This calls into questioning the sustainability of return and 
reintegration in Afghanistan.  
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5.2.1 Voluntary versus Involuntary Returns 
The JWF signals that forced deportations will be accepted in the scope of this 
cooperation, something that has been discouraged in academic debates (Crisp and 
Long, 2016; DeBono, 2016; van Houte et al., 2015). A case study in Afghanistan 
2012 looking at the difference in post-return experience between voluntary and 
involuntary returns, argues that the only returnees who potentially can live up to 
any expectations of a positive return and sustainable reintegration are voluntary 
returnees. It is important to note that the definition of voluntary returnees here, 
differs from the definition provided by the JWF. The academic articles used in this 
thesis regard voluntary returns as cases in which legally staying migrants decide to 
go back to their home country based on their own decision. Involuntary returns in 
this context, can be categorized as independent or forced, and refers to the concepts 
voluntary and forced deportations that is used in the JWF declaration.  The 
respondents of this case study had returned to Afghanistan up to 10 years prior to 
the study. The authors of this research concede that a major challenge was to locate 
returnees and that many had already re-emigrated (van Houte et al., 2015:695). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: van Houte et al., 2015:697 
 
The findings of this study, presented in Table 3, shows that voluntary returnees have 
significantly higher potentially to live up to expectations of successful reintegration. 
Several scholars explain the difference of the post-return experiences between 
voluntary and involuntary returns, by emphasizing that deported migrants have 
generally not accumulated the skills, capital or confidence that are required for a 
successful return (van Houte et al., 2014; Kapur, 2014:481; Carr, 2015:14). Another 
factor could be that deported migrants tend to face greater discrimination, compared 
to voluntary returnees (van Hount et al, 2015). Even if there is a great difference 
between voluntary returnees and deported migrants, these figures show that ‘only’ 
20% of the deported migrants are unemployed, while the majority managed to find 
a job. Essentially, voluntary returns are preferred but involuntary returns do not 
necessarily harm the ability to create a sustainable livelihood upon return for all 
deported migrants.  
From the perspective of the citizens of Afghanistan, voluntary deportations 
should be prioritized since they have greater potential to contribute to economic 
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development of the country and be agents of change (van Houte et al., 2015). In 
contrast, if 3 million deported migrants return, of which the majority are likely to 
end up in low-skilled employment or unemployment, they are likely to raise the 
already very high unemployment rate and put downward pressure on wages 
(Duenwald and Talishli, 2017). This could jeopardize the ability of earning enough 
money to survive for already disadvantaged groups among the citizens of 
Afghanistan. In regard to prospective migrants waiting for their final asylum 
decision, the psychological harm caused by the fear of being deported against their 
will, will be significantly reduced if voluntary deportations would be prioritized. 
How prioritization of voluntary returns would impact the EU member’s states will 
be elaborated on in subsection 5.2.5. 
5.2.2 Reintegration Programs  
Regardless of whether deportation policies are voluntary or forced, reintegration 
programs are of specific importance in order to assist those who are the most 
vulnerable upon return and fails to reintegrate on their own.  As stated earlier, the 
JWF wants to address this issue by providing the reintegration programs that 
specifically focus on skills development, labor market access and job-creation. By 
reviewing outcomes of previous and ongoing programs in Afghanistan that 
provides skills development in order to increase levels of employment, it is evident 
that such programs face multiple challenges. 
Given that the EU and Afghanistan cooperates with the IOM in regard of 
reintegration programs as stated in the JWF, the particular focus of this subsection 
is placed on a report evaluating IOM’s return and reintegration activities in 
Afghanistan (SHC, 2014:5). Their programs were evaluated using surveys, 
distributed to 151 beneficiaries across the country who had participated in 
livelihood training (ibid:42). The majority of the respondent of this survey had 
returned more than five years ago and all participants were unemployed before their 
training, which highlights highlight the enduring cycle of poverty and vulnerability 
that remains long time after their return (ibid:43). 
Source: SHC, 2014:52 
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For the majority of the participants in all groups, the livelihood program did not 
lead to any money earning activities, as the figures in Table. 4 presents. The report 
also states that 60 out of the 65 women who participated said they have not used 
their new skills to earn money (ibid:51). This survey indicates that there are serious 
limitations of reintegration and employment programs for vulnerable groups in 
Afghanistan, especially among deported migrants, which is the scope of the JWF. 
Special consideration should be placed on women, since 92% of the women in these 
livelihood programs did not experience any economic empowerment.  
In the report, IOM identifies the deteriorating economic situation and escalating 
number of deportations from in Pakistan and Iran (this was before the JWF was 
established), as major threats for the success of their reintegration programs in the 
near future (ibid:81). Essentially, drawing from the evidence presented in this 
report, if the current economic context remains, and the efficiency of these 
programs does not face fundamental changes, the impact of reintegration programs 
will have very limited effect on the most vulnerable migrants being returned under 
the JWF agreement. Programs should still be in place and be further developed to 
become more efficient and work with those who already has returned or never left. 
But in order to meet the obligation of liberal, developing states to refrain from 
harming deported migrants, especially vulnerable groups such as women in this 
context, should not be returned unless the economic situation is becoming more 
stable and/or reintegration programs more effective.  
Moreover, sending back vulnerable groups who statistically are likely to fail to 
reintegrate, will not favor the development of the county and could therefore have 
negative effects on the Afghan population in general (see argument in 5.2.1).  
5.2.3 Unaccompanied Minors  
Another vulnerable group that are included in the scope of deportation under the 
JWF declaration is unaccompanied minors. Unaccompanied minors have not 
generally been deported from the EU before this declaration. Instead they have been 
allowed to stay in the member state until they turn 18 (Bowerman, 2017:4). 
Therefore, studies on post-return experiences for young Afghans are limited. 
However, one study has monitored the post-return experience of 45 former child 
asylum seekers who had been forcibly removed to Afghanistan after turning 18, for 
an 18-month period in 2014-15. The findings of this study identified some of the 
main challenges, including discrimination, mental health difficulties, lack of access 
to healthcare and education. The findings showed that it was nearly impossible for 
them to continue their education because of costs and the prioritization of earning 
money for survival.  Moreover, difficulties of finding sustainable work impacted 
young returnees’ ability to survive or remain in Afghanistan, which led to that many 
of the young returnees’ again left Afghanistan during this period. These findings 
are deeply worrying seeing as it harms most of the welfare interests set out in the 
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Refrain from Harm principle, and one should keep in mind that the migrants in this 
study were no longer minors when they were deported (ibid).  
Aside from this, there are additional concerns about how the JFW will increase 
the returns of unaccompanied minors. According to European law, no child should 
be returned unless their best interest has been considered (Oxfram et al, 2016). Still, 
the declaration gives the possibility to return children without having family in 
place to receive them, by stating that establishment of “adequate reception and 
cake-taking arrangements” as a legitimate alternative.  
This is worrying on several accounts. As stated in the Return Handbook created 
by the EU, “adequate reception facilities” should only be an option if reuniting with 
family is not in the child’s best interest and should not be seen as a durable solution 
(EC, 2015:53). This is not how the JWF frames this alternative. The Return 
Handbook further states that adequate reception facilities could be a governmental 
body or a non-governmental institution which shall be “responsible for the 
care/protection of children shall comply with the standards established in the areas 
of safety, health, suitability of staff and competent supervision” (ibid: 52). Applying 
to the context of Afghanistan, a country that suffers from a deteriorating security 
situation and a government that is unstable and highly corrupt, one might question 
whether such care-taking responsibility of unaccompanied minors will be able to 
meet the established living standards. In the IOM evaluation report, it is stated that 
challenges they face in regard to transit centers for unaccompanied minors, is to 
provide satisfactory security in spite of the escalated conflict and that they have 
problem with minors escaping the facility. This refers to centers where the minors 
are placed after arrival, waiting for transportation to go ‘home’ (SHC, 2014:28). 
One could only imagine the challenges a permanent care-taking facility would face.  
The fact that this declaration makes it easier to facilitate deportations of 
unaccompanied minors even if family members in the country is absent, pose a 
great risk of harming welfare interests of both prospective refuge minors and 
deported minors. Deported young Afghans will be exposed to greater risks by this 
policy, both their physical and psychological wellbeing, as well as their safety and 
opportunities to reintegrate will be at stake. In regard to young prospective migrants 
waiting for their asylum decision, deportation under these directions will add on to 
the psychological strains of being deported to a country in conflict, with the fear of 
being deported to a country without having any family to return to.  
In light of the Refrain from Harm principle, and with the best interest of a child 
in mind, deportations of unaccompanied minors should be avoided. But most 
importantly, deportations of children should not be proceeding if family cannot be 
traced in the country of origin. Furthermore, if returning to the family is not in the 
best interest of the child that should be compelling reasons for granting them asylum 
in the host country.  
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5.2.4 Trade-offs  
The previous sub-sections have covered how the deportation policies under the JWF 
violates many of the basic welfare interest that developed countries should refrain 
from harming based on the normative standard of this thesis. Considering the 
deteriorating socioeconomic environment, deported migrants have limited 
possibilities to reintegrate and build a sustainable livelihood, especially under 
involuntary circumstances. Special emphasis has been placed on the danger of 
returning women and children, since they face the greatest challenges and are 
exposed to the greatest harms. Failure to integrate large number of returnees will 
evidently not only harm the deportees, rather, it can have severe consequences for 
the development prospects of the country as a whole and cause significant harm to 
vulnerable groups among the citizens of Afghanistan and cause further emigration 
flows form the country.   
However, if those vulnerable groups were excluded from the scope of 
deportations, the number of migrants residing in the EU would consequently be 
higher, which in turn could cause harm to disadvantaged citizens of the EU. The 
integration process in EU will also have its challenges and negative effects such as 
rising unemployment rates and downward pressure on wages is a possible outcome 
(Toft, 2007:144). This could lower the capabilities of vulnerable groups among the 
host country as well as prospective refugees to engage in the labor market, however 
individuals born outside the EU seems to be most affected (Eurostat, 2015). 
Though, considering that the economy and the labor market in the EU is a lot 
stronger than in Afghanistan, pressure from irregular migrants would cause 
significantly less harm in the EU. For example, the medium unemployment rate is 
the EU is 8 % compared to 40% in Afghanistan (Eurostat, 2017; UNDP, 2016) 
which indicates that the environment in the EU has much greater capability to 
integrate newcomers. Another significant factor is that most EU member states 
provide a social security program that supports you if you fail, where as in 
Afghanistan one cannot expect such security (SSA, 2014). A common critique 
however, is that those support systems could be overwhelm by too many 
immigrants (Toft, 2007:144). But since the alternative would be to deport those 
vulnerable migrants despite the severe harm they could be exposed to, liberal states 
should put the interest of those vulnerable groups in priority, before protecting its 
own economic interests.  
Essentially, it comes down to balancing the distribution of harm in a fair way. 
In this context, I argue that considering the superior socioeconomic environment 
and institutional capacity that most EU member states have in relation to 
Afghanistan, the harm irregular migrants would cause in the EU will be far less 
compared to the harm those migrants would impose in Afghanistan. The severe 
harms the strict deportation policies of the JWF could have on the ability to create 
a sustainable livelihood in Afghanistan, especially for the most vulnerable groups, 
gives reason to condemn these policies as unjust.  
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6 Conclusion   
In this paper, I have examined what moral obligations developed states ought to 
have towards developing countries and its citizens in adopting deportation policies, 
and furthermore studied whether the deportation policies enforced by the JWF 
declaration lives up to those obligations. 
The central argument of this thesis is that developed states are obligated to 
refrain from harming basic welfare interests of already disadvantaged groups, and 
compensate those who already have been harmed. However, deportation policies 
are a complicated issue as it entails balancing the distribution of harm among 
several disadvantaged groups. In this regard, this thesis argues that the most 
disadvantaged should be prioritized.  
Based on empirical evidence from previous and ongoing deportation and 
reintegration efforts in Afghanistan, this thesis show that Afghanistan does not have 
the capability to ensure safe and sustainable returns at this point. Because of the 
deteriorating socioeconomic and political environment that characterize the current 
situation in Afghanistan, deportations enforced by the JWF will pose a great risk of 
harming basic welfare interest of deported migrants as well as the non-migrated 
citizens of Afghanistan.  Consequently, unsustainable deportations will also have 
the potential of stimulating further refugee flows, which is the opposite of the 
desired outcome for all actors involved.  
Concerning the potential harm of not deporting migrants, I argue that 
considering the superior economic- and political stability and institutional capacity 
that most EU member states have in relation to Afghanistan, the harm irregular 
migrants would cause in the EU will be far less compared to the harm those 
migrants would impose in Afghanistan. Moreover, this thesis condemns afghans in 
Afghanistan as more disadvantaged compared to disadvantaged citizens in the EU, 
which implies that the interest of Afghan nationals should be prioritized.   
In light of these arguments, I claim that the deportations enforced by the JWF 
do not live up to the obligations of developed states that have been put forward in 
this thesis. I conclude that greater attention on how the political response in 
receiving countries affects the development prospects in the refugee generating 
countries need to be incorporated into deportation policies to a greater extent. 
Partly, because improving the situation in the refugee generating countries is an 
important component in order to find a more sustainable solution to the refugee 
crisis in the long run, but also simply because it is not morally just for developed 
countries to impose such extensive harm on others in order to protect their own 
interest.  
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I believe that the normative and empirical aspects and consequences of 
deportation policies is an important field of study and should continue to be 
examined, as it can have fundamental consequences for how developed states 
choses to respond to the refugee crisis, how migrants are treated and for the future 
development of refugee generating countries.  
 
 
  28 
7 References 
Arowolo, O. (2000). Return Migration and the Problem of Reintegration. 
International Migration, 38(5), pp.59-82.  
Bowerman, E. (2017) Risks encountered after forced removal: the return 
experiences of young Afghans. Forced Migration Review, 54 (1), pp.78-80.  
Bryman, Alan. 2008. Social research methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
690 p   
Carr, H. (2014). Returning 'Home': Experiences of Reintegration for Asylum 
Seekers and Refugees. British Journal of Social Work, 44(suppl 1), pp.140-
i156.  
Castles S. and Miller, M.J. (2009). The Age of Migration: International 
Population Movements in the Modern World (4th edition). Basingstoke: 
Palgrave MacMillan 
Crisp, J. and Long, K. (2016). Safe and Voluntary Refugee Repatriation: From 
Principle to Practice. Journal on Migration and Human Security, 4(3), 
pp.141-147. 
DeBono, D. (2016) Returning and deporting irregular migrants: not a solution to 
the ‘refugee crisis’, In Human Geography, 9(2), pp. 101-112.   
Duenwald, C. and Talishli, F. (2017). Return of Afghan Refugees to Afghanistan 
Surges as Country Copes to Rebuild. [online] Imf.org. Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/01/26/NA012617-Return-of-
Afghan-Refugees-to-Afghanistan-Surges-Country-Copes-Rebuild [Accessed 
8 May 2017]. 
Dunne, T., Kurki, M. and Smith, S. (2013). International relations theories. 3rd 
ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, cop. 
Engelmann, C. (2014). Convergence against the Odds: The Development of Safe 
Country of Origin Policies in EU Member States (1990–2013). European 
Journal of Migration and Law, 16(2), pp.277-302. 
European Commission (EC) (2015). Return Handbook. [online] European 
Commission. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs 
/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-
implementation-package/docs/return_handbook_en.pdf [Accessed 7 May 
2017]. 
European Commission (EC) (2017). Consular Protection. [online] Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/consularprotection/traveladvice/search_en [Accessed 23 
May 2017]. 
European Commission and European External Action Service (EC and EEAS) 
(2016). Country Fiche proposing possible leverages across Commission-
EEAS policy areas to enhance returns and effectively implement readmission 
  29 
commitments. [online] Statewatch. Available at: http://statewatch.org/news/ 
2016/mar/eu-council-afghanistan-6738-16.pdf [Accessed 9 Apr. 2017]. 
European External Action Service (EEAS) (2016). The EU and Afghanistan hold 
a Senior Officials' Dialogue on Migration. [online] Available at: 
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/11108/the-eu-
and-afghanistan-hold-asenior-officials-dialogue-on-migration_en [Accessed 4 
Apr. 2017]. 
Eurostat (2015). Unemployment rates of population aged 20–64, by groups of 
country of birth and sex, 2015. [online] Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File: 
Unemployment_rates_of_population_aged_20%E2%80%9364,_by_groups_o
f_country_of_birth_and_sex,_2015.png [Accessed 23 May 2017]. 
Eurostat. (2017). Unemployment rates, seasonally adjusted, March 2017 (%). 
[online] Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/ 
index.php/File:Unemployment_rates,_seasonally_adjusted,_March_2017_(%
25)_F2.png [Accessed 23 May 2017]. 
Fund for peace (2017). Fragile States Index | The Fund for Peace. [online] 
Available at: http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/ [Accessed 18 May 2017]. 
Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. and Tan, N. (2017). The End of the Deterrence Paradigm? 
Future Directions for Global Refugee Policy. Journal on Migration and 
Human Security, 5(1), p.28.   
Higgins, P. (2013). Immigration Justice. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hunt, M. (2014). The Safe Country of Origin Concept in European Asylum Law: 
Past, Present and Future. International Journal of Refugee Law, 26(4), 
pp.500-535. 
Jazayery, L. (2002). The Migration-Development Nexus: Afghanistan Case 
Study. International Migration, 40(5), pp.231-254. 
Kapur, D. (2014) ‘Political effects of international migration’, Annual Review of 
Political Science, 17(1), pp. 479–502. 
López, A. (2010). Taking the human rights of migrants seriously: towards a 
decolonised global justice. The International Journal of Human Rights, 14(5), 
pp.658-677. 
Meyers, D. (2014). Poverty, agency, and human rights. 1st ed. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Miller, David (1995), On Nationality, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Minter, W. (2011). African migration, global inequalities, and human rights. 
connecting the dots. 1st ed. Uppsala: Nordic African Institute. 
Monsutti, A. (2008). Afghan Migratory Strategies and the Three Solutions to the 
Refugee Problem. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 27(1), pp.58-73. 
Nyberg-Sorensen, N., Hear, N. and Engberg-Pedersen, P. (2002). The Migration-
Development Nexus: Evidence and Policy Options. International Migration, 
40(5), pp.49-73. 
  30 
Owen, D. (2016). Refugees, Fairness and Taking up the Slack: On Justice and the 
International Refugee Regime. Moral Philosophy and Politics, 3(2). 
Oxfam - Médecins du monde/Doctors of the World international network - World 
Vision - Save the children - Cordaid - Action contre la faim/Action Against 
Hunger (ACF) - Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) - International Federation for 
Human Rights (FIDH) - Amnesty International - European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) - International Catholic Migration Commission 
(ICMC) - Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants 
(PICUM) - European Association for the Defense of Human Rights (AEDH) - 
Emergency - Organization Aid to Refugees (OPS) - Terre des Hommes 
(international federation) - PRO ASYL - NAGA – Actalliance - Slovenska 
Filantropija - Access Info Europe - European Network against Racism - 
Solidar - Demetra - Justice and Peace Netherlands - Migrant Rights Centre 
Ireland – MENEDEK (2016). The European Parliament must immediately 
address the Joint Way Forward Agreement between the EU and Afghanistan. 
[online] Available at: https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_ 
attachments/joint_statement_eu-afghanistan_deal.pdf [Accessed 7 Mar. 
2017]. 
Özerdem, A. and Sofizada, A. (2006). Sustainable reintegration to returning 
refugees in post-Taliban Afghanistan: land-related challenges. Conflict, 
Security & Development, 6(1), pp.75-100. 
Pogge, T (2002), World Poverty and Human Rights, Malden, MA: Polity Press. 
Potter, R., Binns, T., Elliott, J. and Drakakis-Smith, D. (2008). Geographies of 
development. 3rd ed. Harlow: Pearson Education. 
Ratner, S. (2013). Ethics and international law: integrating the global justice 
project(s). International Theory, 5(01), pp.1-34. 
Rawls, J. (1999), The Law of Peoples, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Robert, C. and Zeckhauser, R. (2011). The methodology of normative policy 
analysis. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 30(3), pp.613-643. 
Samuel Hall Consulting (SHC) (2014). Evaluating IOM’s Return and 
Reintegration activities for Returnees and Other Displaced Populations, 
commissioned by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Kabul. 
[online] Available at: 
https://afghanistan.iom.int/sites/default/files/migrated_files/2013/04/ 
Evaluating-IOMs-Return-and-Reintegration-Activities-for-Returnees-and-
Other-Displaced-Populations-in-Afghanistan_Full-Report.pdf [Accessed 10 
May 2017]. 
Social Security Administration (SSA) (2014). Social Security Programs 
Throughout the World: Europe, 2014. [online] SSA Publication No. 13-
11801. Available at: https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2014-
2015/europe/ssptw14europe.pdf [Accessed 23 May 2017]. 
The European Union and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (EU and Afghanistan) 
(2016). Joint Way Forward on migration issues between Afghanistan and the 
EU. [online] Kabul: European Union External Action. Available at:  
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_afghanistan_joint_way_forward_on_
migration_issues.pdf [Accessed 6 Apr. 2017]. 
  31 
Thomas, A. and Allen, T. (2000) . Poverty and development into the 21st century. 
1st ed. Oxford:Oxford Univ. Press. 
Toft, M. (2007). The Myth of the Borderless World: Refugees and Repatriation 
Policy. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 24(2), pp.139-157.   
Tremblay, J. and Abi-Zeid, I. (2015). Value-based argumentation for policy 
decision analysis: methodology and an exploratory case study of a 
hydroelectric project in Québec. Annals of Operations Research, 236(1), 
pp.233-253. 
UNDP (2016). About Afghanistan. [online] Available at: 
http://www.af.undp.org/content/afghanistan/en/home/countryinfo.html 
[Accessed 23 May 2017]. 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2016). Global 
Trends Forced Displacement in 2015. [online] UNHCR. Available at:  
http://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.pdf [Accessed 12 Apr. 2017]. 
van Houte, M. and Davis, T. (2014). Moving Back or Moving Forward? Return 
Migration,  Development and Peace-Building. New Diversities, 16(2), pp. 71-
87. 
van Houte, M., Siegel, M. and Davids, T. (2015). Return to Afghanistan: 
Migration as Reinforcement of Socio-Economic Stratification. Population, 
Space and Place, 21(8), pp.692-703. 
Vision of Humanity (2016). Vision of Humanity. [online] Available at: 
http://static.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/indexes/global-peace-index 
[Accessed 23 May 2017]. 
Walzer, M. (1983). Spheres of justice. 1st ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Wilcox, S. (2007), “Immigrant admissions and global relations of harm,” Journal 
of Social Philosophy 38:2, pp. 274–91. 
 
 
 
 
 
